corporate tax rates to improve competitiveness in an increasingly global economy. Much of the 1986 Act reform of the corporate taxbase-broadening combined with lower rates-has unraveled, leaving the United States with a high statutory corporate tax rate and narrow corporate tax base.' Despite renewed interest in base-broadening and loophole-closing, the goal of corporate tax reform remains elusive. On one hand, the Administration appears to favor increased expensing of investment as an incremental step toward fundamental tax reform On the other hand, current legislative proposals would broaden the corporate tax base and reduce the maximum corporate tax rate. 3 Thus far, proponents of corporate tax reform have largely sidestepped the controversial issue of whether the 2003 tax cuts on dividends and capital gains should be made permanent. Given the importance of the relationship between the maximum individual and corporate tax rates, the issue of corporate tax reform cannot be divorced from the issue of whether to extend the 2003 tax cuts and the accompanying revenue and distributional concerns.
Although the direction of corporate tax reform remains uncertain, current proposals should be viewed in light of the overall decline of the corporate tax as well as the strange transformation of the Administration's ill-fated 2003 dividend-exclusion proposal. 4 This article proceeds in three parts. The first part discusses the long-term decline in the role of the corporate tax in raising federal revenues and enhancing progressivity. Part two discusses how the Administration's 2003 proposal to eliminate double-level corporate taxation morphed into an unstable legislative compromise based on tax-rate parity for dividends and capital gains. Part three considers two contrasting alternative goals reflected in current proposals for reform of business taxation: reduced corporate tax rates and enhanced expensing of new I See, e.g ., Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform Unraveling, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71, 81-82 (2007). investment. The article concludes that 1986-style base-broadening and reduced rates would improve competitiveness and limit tax sheltering opportunities, although a political consensus for such reform will be hard to forge and additional sources of revenue may be required to finance significant rate reductions.
II. DECLINE OF THE CORPORATE TAX

A. Long-Term Decline
Over the last half century, the corporate tax has declined significantly as a source of federal revenue and as a percentage of GDP. While corporate taxes accounted for nearly 30% of total federal revenues and 5.6% of GDP in 1953, by 2003 corporate taxes accounted for 7% of total federal revenues and 1.2% of GDP. 5 The decline of the corporate tax has been accompanied by increased reliance on the individual income and payroll taxes to fund revenue needs. The shrinking role of the corporate tax is the outcome of several factors-most notably, the expansion of S corporations and partnerships, which accounted for 36% of business net income in 2004.6 The popularity of passthrough entities is attributable largely to the ability to avoid corporate-level taxes while retaining limited liability. Since high-bracket taxpayers receive a disproportionate share of passthrough income, recent reductions in individual income tax rates have significantly benefitted this group of business owners.8 5 See Jane G. Gravelle, The Corporate Tax: Where Has It Been and Where Is It Going, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 903, 903-04 (2004 TO 2018 TO , at 92-93 (2008 [hereinafter CBO, BUDGET OUTLOOK] (projecting corporate tax revenue declining to around 1.7% of GDP by 2018).
6 Between 1980 and 2004, S corporations increased their share of business net income from 1% to 15%, while partnerships increased their share from 3% to 21%; during the same period, the share of sole proprietorships declined from 17% to 14%. See TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 14. 7 Between 1980 and 2004, the noncorporate sector's share of net business income increased from 22% to 50%. See id. at 13. In 2004, the 17,500 largest C corporations generated nearly half of business net income and paid 91% of all corporate income taxes. See id. at 12. 8 See id. at 16 (estimating that, in 2007, "84 percent of the tax reduction from the top rate reduction will go to flow-through business owners"). [Vol. 28:341 Beginning in the 1990's, the corporate tax has also been undermined by the explosion of tax shelters and aggressive tax planning, innovation in financial instruments, and migration of income abroad. 9 These developments give rise to concerns that the corporate tax may no longer serve as a secure and robust source of federal revenue.
B. Role of Corporate Tax
The decline of the corporate tax may undermine the progressivity of the tax system overall. While the ultimate incidence of the corporate tax remains hotly contested, traditional analysis generally assumes that the burden is borne by all owners of capital, rather than solely by corporate shareholders.' 0 Because aggregate capital ownership is more concentrated among higher-income taxpayers than labor income or consumption, the corporate tax may be viewed as contributing to overall progressivity. The corporate tax would appear even more progressive if the burden were allocated entirely to shareholders, since this group is more affluent than owners of capital as a whole." A recent study suggests that the "dramatic drop in progressivity [since the 1960's] at the upper end of the income distribution is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and to a lesser extent estate and gift taxes, both of which fall on capital 9 Tax shelter activity is viewed as playing a significant role in the gap between corporate "book" and "tax" income. In addition to raising revenue and enhancing progressivity, the corporate tax may also play an important role in backstopping the individual income tax. 3 Whenever the maximum corporate tax rate is lower than the maximum individual tax rate-as was the case before 1986-individuals can potentially enhance after-tax returns by investing through corporations and deferring realization of accrued gains. To the extent that shareholder-level gains are taxed at preferential rates (or may escape tax altogether if the stock is held until death), the combined burden of the double-level tax may often not be significantly greater than a single-level individual tax levied at ordinary income rates. The 1986 Act lessened the attractiveness of sheltering by raising the maximum corporate tax rate above the maximum individual rate and taxing both dividends and capital gains at ordinary income rates. The restoration of a capital gains preference in the 1990's-and even more significantly the 2003 tax cuts-may render sheltering once again attractive. The problem of sheltering would be exacerbated if, in the future, corporate tax rates are reduced without any corresponding change in dividend and capital gain tax rates. The current preferential 15% rate may also encourage financial engineering and conversion of returns to labor into tax-favored dividends and capital gain, thereby jeopardizing the effectiveness of the overall income tax.
C. Economic Distortions
The existence of a separate corporate tax has long been criticized as causing economic distortions, which are exacerbated to the extent that, for a given level of revenue, corporate tax preferences imply higher corporate tax rates. Significantly, the corporate tax tends to penalize investment in corporate rather than noncorporate form and to favor debt over equity. The Congressional Budget Office has recently estimated that the combined corporate-level and individual- Investment in the noncorporate sector is taxed even more lightly, since the effective tax rate is only around 20.6%.15 While the ETTR on corporate equity-financed investments is 36.1% (slightly above the 35% statutory rate because of investor-level taxes), the rate on corporate debt-financed investments is actually negative 6.4% (a difference of 42.5 percentage points).
16 Debt-financed investments are subsidized because corporations may deduct accelerated depreciation and the nominal amount of interest (including an inflation premium); the benefit of the corporate deduction is not fully offset by taxes levied on interest recipients who may be lightly taxed (or not taxed at all). Significant differences in the tax burdens across different classes of assets reflect the magnitude of bonuses (or penalties) generated by accelerated depreciation and various investment subsidies. 17 While the 2003 tax cuts may ameliorate the uneven treatment of corporate/noncorporate investments and debt/equity investments, alternative reforms might well have proved less costly and more efficient.
Under a well-designed system of corporate-shareholder integration, all corporate income would be taxed once (and only once) at nonpreferential rates. 8 15 See id. at 8 tbl.1. 16 See id. Under a fully integrated system, if taxes were imposed only on real economic profits (ignoring inflation), the tax rate on debt-financed investment would be zero, while the tax rate on equity-financed investment would be the statutory rate of 35%. 17 See id. at 10-11 tbl. 415, 416 (Jan. 20, 2003) . 20 [Vol. 28:341 Thus, in the simplest case where earnings were fully taxed at the corporate level, the Administration's proposal generally achieved parity between distributed and retained earnings and eliminated any shareholder-level tax. If corporate income were fully (or partially) sheltered, however, the proposal did not neutralize the advantage to shareholders of extracting such earnings at preferential capital gain rates. A dividend distribution of fully-sheltered corporate earnings would attract an ordinary-income tax at the shareholder-level, since the dividend would be entirely includible. By contrast, if the same fully-sheltered corporate earnings were distributed in the form of a share repurchase, the distribution would attract a lower capital gain tax, leaving the shareholder with a higher after-tax amount. Since shareholders can extract corporate earnings through stock sales (or nondividend distributions treated as stock sales), the Administration's proposal was thus unlikely to have any significant effect on the taxminimizing strategy of sheltering, retention, and repurchase."
B. Fifteen Percent Solution
Whatever its merits as a corporate integration measure, the Administration's proposal failed to attract support from any major political constituency. 0 Instead, the proposal met resistance from business groups who saw it as complex, burdensome, and inimical to corporate-level tax preferences. Under pressure from Republican deficit hawks, Senate Finance Chairman Grassley agreed to limit the cost of any tax package in conference to $350 billion-less than half the amount sought by the Administration. Grassley reported a bill that included a pared-down dividend exclusion coupled with several corporate tax offsets. By the narrowest possible margin, a last-minute amendment by Senator Nickles prevailed on the Senate floor, which was far more costly than the modest exclusion in Grassley's original bill. While the Nickles "disappearing dividend exclusion" allowed the retained earnings, shareholders would be permitted to increase the basis of their stock to reflect a ratable share of fully-taxed retained earnings. See id. at 14 (describing "retained earnings basis adjustment"). 29 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 19, at 420 (suggesting that "an increase... in the effective tax rate on accruing capital gains" would be needed to achieve the Administration's "ostensible goals"). Administration to claim victory of sorts," it was clear that the Administration had lost the support of key business groups who threw their support behind the House bill which abandoned any pretense of integration in favor of a straightforward tax rate cut for dividends and capital gains. The "15% solution" advocated by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas offered a "politically potent combination of tax cuts that benefited investors without jeopardizing existing corporate tax preferences. 32 In the end, the conference committee followed the House bill; by terminating the tax cuts at the end of 2008, the conferees brought the overall revenue cost down to $350 billion. 33
C. Unstable Compromise
The legislation that emerged in 2003 is both bizarre and inherently unstable. Congress enacted a 15% rate for dividends regardless of whether such dividends were previously taxed at the corporate level. Simultaneously, in the guise of reducing double taxation of corporate earnings, Congress reduced the rate on all capital gains whether or not such gains are derived from retained 34 earnings. If tax-rate parity for dividends and capital gains were indeed perceived as permanent, it would be necessary to address the underlying premise of corporate tax provisions designed primarily to prevent bailout of corporate earnings at favorable capital gain rates. These anti-bailout provisions no longer serve much, if any, purpose, except potentially to defer recovery of basis. Far from making the tax system simpler and more efficient, the 2003 tax cuts open up fresh opportunities for tax avoidance and invite financial technicians to discover new ways to convert compensation, interest, and other ordinary income into tax-favored dividends.
The Administration's arguments for permanent extension of the 2003 tax cuts ignore the potentially significant differences between the effects of a temporary dividend tax cut and those of a permanent tax The Administration pressed for extension of the 2003 tax cuts based on incomplete and potentially misleading claims that the cuts had unleashed an "unprecedented" surge in dividend payouts, raised stock prices, and stimulated economic growth. 37 In announcing unexpectedly high collections of corporate and individual taxes in its 2006 mid-year review, the Office of Management and Budget credited the 2003 tax cuts with "stimulating and sustaining a strong economy., 3 8 The 2006 spike in tax revenues reflected the expanding share of pre-tax income going to corporations and wealthy individuals 39 who pay tax at a higher rate than average earners. In fact, any suggestion that the 2003 tax cuts are "paying for themselves" is inherently implausible. Even the Treasury's own dynamic analysis shows that the tax cuts have only modest potential to increase growth over a lengthy period, even assuming drastic spending cuts starting in 35 See Bank, supra note 4, at 573 (noting that in the absence of tax rate parity between current and future distributions, the 2003 Act "offered firms an incentive to distribute dividends currently"). political agenda, driven by two divergent concerns. On one hand, reform of business taxation implicates concerns about tax equity and the search for revenue to offset budget deficits and help pay for reform of the individual income tax and the alternative minimum tax (AMT). 1 On the other hand, there is impetus for cutting business taxes based on concerns about the competitiveness of U.S. firms, particularly in light of rate cuts abroad and shifting of U.S. corporate profits to low-tax countries. While these two crosscurrents could converge around reforms involving base-broadening and rate reductions, the political environment for such reforms is much less favorable than in 1986. Constrained by the goal of revenue neutrality, the 1986 Act reforms were actually aimed at increasing expected revenues from the corporate tax, through lower rates on a broader base, to finance individual tax cuts." Although current opportunities for base-broadening exist, internationalization may impose significant 53 constraints on the use of the corporate tax to raise revenue. Moreover, given the need for additional revenue to fund existing government programs and the expected future burdens imposed by an aging society, the goal of revenue neutrality itself may be unrealistic.
A. Rangel Proposal
Current proposals indicate support across a broad political spectrum for cutting corporate tax rates. While focused principally on AMT relief on the individual side, the omnibus tax bill introduced by House Ways & Means Committee Chairman Rangel in October 2007 would replace the two top corporate tax rates with a single lower rate (30.5%) and allow increased expensing for relatively small 51 See Graetz, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that, under current law, AMT collections will exceed collections from the regular tax by 2010). By contrast, the corporate AMT no longer raises significant revenue and could be eliminated as part of broad-based corporate reform; nevertheless, it would be necessary to address the nearly $30 billion of AMT credits outstanding. See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 105-06; Curtis P. Carlson, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS PAPER 93: THE CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX-AGGREGATE HISTORICAL TRENDS 2, 7 (2005) (attributing decline of the corporate AMT to changes in the AMT rules in the 1990's and temporary bonus depreciation enacted in 2002).
52 See Graetz, supra note 13, at 122 (noting that the 1986 reform was "politically possible" because of the split within the business community between capitalintensive industries, which desired faster depreciation write-offs, and service companies, which benefitted from lower corporate tax rates See TREASURY BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 2, at 8-9 (noting that section 199
requires "a completely new set of accounting distinctions" and forces nearly all taxpayers "to make transfer pricing determinations"). 57 Given the government's recent success in litigating tax shelter cases, the estimated revenue gain ($3.8 billion over ten years) is attributable mainly to penalties associated with codification of the economic substance doctrine. 873, 876 tbl. 3 (Nov. 26, 2007) . 62 Although taxing both capital gains and dividends at ordinary income tax rates would offer the greatest potential for simplification, a possible compromise would be to tax both capital gains and dividends at 25%; thus, the tax rate on capital gains would be increased from 20% to 25% while the tax rate on dividends would be reduced from 39% to 25%. See Graetz, supra note 13, at 95-96 (noting that "it is not at all clear that any revenue lost by taxing capital gains at 15 percent ... rather than rate is aimed at promoting international competitiveness, an argument could be made for limiting the tax benefit to publicly-traded firms that are most likely to compete globally. As a political matter, however, it may be quite difficult to deny the benefit of corporate tax rate cuts to small privately-held firms whose owners seek to avoid higher individual rates on passthrough income." Thus, the Rangel proposal could affect choice-of-entity decisions and revive the issue of whether privately-held firms should be permitted to choose between the singletax and double-tax systems to minimize taxes. 64
B. Treasury Approach
During 2007, the Treasury also turned its attention to corporate tax reform. The Treasury's background paper, issued in July 2007, focused primarily on efficiency issues and international comparisons.
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After the 1986 Act, the maximum U.S. statutory corporate tax rate was among the lowest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); it is now one of the highest, even though U.S. corporate tax collections as a percentage of GDP are less than 66 the OECD average. Many OECD countries have responded to tax competition by reducing corporate tax rates and broadening the corporate tax base. These base-broadening efforts appear generally to have contributed significantly, despite lower rates, to stabilizing the proportion of corporate taxes as a share of GDP.
6
' Thus, the simple story of a "race to the bottom" as a result of tax competition for say, 20 or 25 percent, is compensated for by increased savings, investment, or economic growth").
63 If the lower tax rate on business income were available to passthrough entities, there would be a tremendous incentive to convert wages into a distributive share of profits, thereby reducing the tax burden on high-income business owners. Cf. TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 50-51 (carving out business income of passthrough entities for a "special reduced business tax rate as part of the individual income tax"; the special rate would be set equal to the maximum corporate rate). 45-47 (1999 rates are also quite close. 69 Thus, the data do not unambiguously support the notion that "the U.S. is a high tax country with respect to investment" or that it would "become so... if some reductions occur in the future in other countries. 70 The United States has a relatively low average corporate tax rate (corporate tax divided by corporate profits), suggesting that the United States may have a "higher than average level of corporate tax preferences" and a correspondingly narrow corporate tax base. 7 '
See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT-TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: REPORTER'S STUDY
If all corporate preferences were abolished, the Treasury background paper concluded, the corporate tax rate could be cut to around 27% or, alternatively, businesses could be allowed to expense roughly two fifths of investment costs. 72 In a subsequent report released in December 2007, the Treasury appeared to veer away from a rate-cutting, base-broadening approach in favor of partial expensing NOTES 456, 458-59 (Jan. 28, 2008) ; see also ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 83 (2007) (noting that expensing has more "bang for the buck" than statutory rate reductions). 74 See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 44 (broadening the tax base would allow the maximum corporate rate to be reduced to 28%); see id. at iii (noting that the United States would still have "the fifth highest tax rate" in the OECD if the corporate tax rate were reduced to 28%). If accelerated depreciation were retained, a implication, paying for tax rate cuts by broadening the corporate base might reduce or even eliminate any economic gains by increasing the effective tax burden on capital income. 75 While rate-cutting and base-broadening could be accomplished within the existing hybrid income-tax system, the Administration evidently prefers expensing as an incremental step toward a 76 consumption tax. Unlike the traditional emphasis on neutrality and efficiency through low rates on a broad base, expensing would effectively exempt the return from new investment without providing any benefit for existing investment eligible for depreciation deductions. 7 7 Thus, the expensing approach focuses on boosting capital formation rather than on enhancing competitiveness and increasing efficiency by narrowing the range of effective tax rates on different types of corporate investment. While suggesting that economic gains could be significantly enhanced by reducing the corporate tax rate even more steeply or moving toward fuller expensing, the Treasury acknowledged that base-broadening alone would not pay for these more ambitious reforms." Thus, the fundamental choice would seem to be between revenue-neutral basebroadening and an overall reduction in the tax burden on business income, regardless of revenue neutrality. Concerns about the Administration's commitment to revenue-neutral reform of business taxes have been fueled by recent claims of a "free lunch" based on behavioral responses to a significantly lower revenue-maximizing revenue-neutral reform would permit the U.S. corporate tax rate to be reduced only to 31%, leaving the United States with "the third highest tax rate" in the OECD. See id. at ii-iii. 75 See id. at 44 (noting that "repeal of special tax provisions means a higher tax burden" on investments); id. (noting that a revenue-neutral reform would likely yield "negligible or small gains"). The add-on investor-level tax presumably reflects a sound judgment that taxing wages alone is not politically viable. The investor-level tax not only fails to satisfy the consumption-tax goal of eliminating all taxes on capital income, but also creates a significant incentive to shelter 81 investment income in a business. Under the Advisory Panel's approach, businesses would be forced to give up existing depreciation and interest deductions in return for exemption of the normal return on business investments (through immediate expensing), coupled with a 30% business tax levied on risky and supranormal returns. Because transition relief would be extremely costly, the Advisory Panel provided only a five-year phase-out of deductions for depreciation and interest." Thus, taxpayers with heavily debt-financed assets would potentially lose a significant fraction of both interest and depreciation deductions, and no relief would be provided on turnover of current inventories. The Advisory Panel supported its claims of distributional neutrality by modeling the business tax component (essentially a VAT with a subtraction for wages) "as if it were an income tax" that would fall disproportionately on high-income taxpayers.84 Conspicuously absent from the Treasury's initial background paper was any consideration of the distributional implications of corporate tax reform. In its December 2007 report, the Treasury provided two alternative sets of assumptions for the purpose of analyzing distributional effects-one assigning the burden of the corporate tax entirely to owners of capital and the other assigning most of the burden to labor. According to the Treasury, the alternative assumption reflects the "increasingly common view that a substantial portion of the corporate income tax is borne by labor," building on some recent empirical studies concerning the influence of increased international capital mobility and openness of markets."' Based on the underlying assumption that any reforms-basebroadening or partial expensing-would be "revenue neutral on capital income" over the budget period, it is hardly surprising that the Treasury found virtually no change in the overall distribution of the federal tax burden, particularly given the small magnitude of the corporate tax and relatively constant shares of different types of See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 52-53 (allocating 70% of the corporate tax burden to labor under alternative assumption); see also CEA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 82 (2007) reforms. 9 ' Indeed, the distributional impact of the 1986 reforms and the 1993 increase in the maximum corporate rate from 34% to 35% would look quite different if labor were assumed to bear most of the burden of the corporate tax. Moreover, a corporate tax cut that is not accompanied by significant base broadening would ultimately need to be paid for by increasing taxes or reducing spending. Thus, the distributional effect of reducing the corporate tax rate cannot be assessed without knowing how such a rate cut would ultimately be financed. 9 2
C. Superiority of Rate Cuts and Base-Broadening
In very general terms, the Rangel proposal and the Treasury reports suggest two competing options for corporate tax reform: if existing corporate preferences are cut back, the revenue gain could be used to reduce corporate tax rates or, alternatively, to provide enhanced expensing of new investment. In terms of both equity and efficiency, rate-cutting combined with base-broadening along the lines of the 1986 Act may be viewed as the preferable approach. While the current high statutory rates are quite distortionary, the U.S. corporate tax raises comparatively little revenue. Lowering the corporate tax rate would reduce the bias in favor of debt financing, investment in noncorporate form, and shifting of corporate profits to low-tax jurisdictions." Moreover, lowering the corporate tax rate would discourage corporate tax shelters, thereby helping to finance rate cuts and prevent further erosion of the corporate tax base. As the European experience suggests, rate-cutting and base-broadening may be the best means of preserving the corporate income tax as a significant source of revenue.
By contrast, partial expensing without disallowing interest deductions would invite massive sheltering that would undermine both the individual and corporate tax bases. Allowing both expensing and deductibility of interest would yield negative tax rates and encourage debt-financed investments that would be uneconomic 91 See Gravelle & Smetters, supra note 90, at 1 (noting that the Joint Committee on Taxation "avoided the incidence controversy altogether by ignoring the corporate tax in its distributional analysis" of the 1986 Act).
92 See ARON-DINE, supra note 88, at 15 (concluding that low and middle-income households would be hurt most if a corporate rate reduction were paid for by splitting the financing cost equally among all households). 9' See TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 43.
"from its current position as a high-tax rate country to a low-tax rate country" suggests a painless solution that ignores the need for tradeoffs and revenue concerns. 9 If the lobbying surrounding the 2003 tax cuts provides any lesson, it seems highly unrealistic to expect that business would be willing to give up all existing tax preferences in return for an across-the-board rate cut. 1 0 Given revenue constraints, business tax reform will inevitably create both winners and losers.
While there is clearly much room for base-broadening, it may be necessary to secure additional sources of revenue to help finance a significant reduction in corporate tax rates. Thus, corporate tax reform might well provide another reason for introducing a low-rate VAT, thereby reducing reliance on the individual income tax and corporate tax and aligning the mix of U.S. taxes more closely to that of other OECD countries. 101 Given the demonstrated workability of the VAT around the world, the United States should consider a low-
102
rate VAT to supplement the existing corporate tax. Retaining the existing corporate tax alongside a low-rate VAT would avoid the need to address a host of difficult and costly transition issues that would arise if the existing corporate tax were replaced with a cash-flow business tax.
There is a risk that the Administration's slogan of increased corporate competitiveness may be used as a pretext for providing additional tax cuts for high-income investors and business owners.
Echoing the notion that labor already bears most of the burden of the 99 TREASURY APPROACHES, supra note 2, at 45. The Treasury's focus on high statutory rates ignores the fact that the United States has a relatively narrow corporate tax base.
100 The initial reaction to the Treasury's 2007 conference on competitiveness was divorced from reform of the corporate-level tax. Lower corporate tax rates would lessen the economic gains from integration of corporate and shareholder taxes, further undermining the argument for extending the 2003 tax cuts. Allowing the 2003 tax cuts to sunset would not only allow greater flexibility in reducing corporate tax rates but would also curtail a costly and regressive windfall and help pay for lower corporate tax rates. Since individual income tax rates may significantly exceed the maximum corporate tax rate in the future, there would be greater need to prevent use of corporations to shelter individual income taxed at higher rates. The Administration's piecemeal approach to business taxation does not move in the direction of a well-designed consumption tax. Enhanced expensing combined with continued deductibility of interest would provide a strong incentive to use corporate debt financing and open new tax shelter opportunlues. Noncorporate business owners would have an incentive to use debt financing not only to eliminate investment income but also to reduce taxes on compensation. If the withering of the corporate tax is to be halted, 1986-style reform that combines the carrot of rate-cutting with the stick of base-broadening seems to offer the most promising approach. The United States would do well to follow the example of its major competitors which have broadened their corporate tax bases and lowered their corporate tax rates, thereby enhancing competitiveness and preserving the corporate tax as a source of revenue. More substantial reduction of the corporate tax rate may require additional revenue sources such as a low-rate VAT that would also help to finance other needed reforms, including reform of the AMT. In an era of escalating and intractable budget deficits, reducing corporate tax rates without replacing the lost revenue is no longer a realistic option.
107 For an alternative corporate tax reform that would eliminate the debt-equity distinction, see generally EDWARD D. KLEINBARD 921 (Feb. 25, 2008) . By taxing supranormal returns at the corporate level and normal returns at the investor level, the BEIT potentially offers an attractive model of corporate-shareholder integration. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Why the BElT Proposal Shouldn't Be Discounted," 118 TAX NOTES 1048 (Mar. 3, 2008 .
